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Weimar Germany’s foreign policy and the protection of minorities: The case 
of the German minority in Poland
Abstract
The protection of  minorities in Central Europe became a deeply controversial issue in 
the aftermath of  World War One. The presence of  a sizeable German minority in what 
had become Polish territory following the Versailles settlement played into the hands 
of  political extremists on both sides when the German anti-Weimar right and Polish 
nationalists saw an opportunity to use the minority issue as a tool for revisionism. Whi-
lst acknowledging that certain revisionist objectives were indeed pursued by Weimar 
governments, this article argues that democratic and republican forces did not use the 
minority problem as a direct tool for German expansionism in Eastern Europe.
Key words: Weimar Republic, protection of  minorities, Germany, Poland, Stresemann, 
League of  Nations.
La política exterior de la Alemania de Weimar y la protección de las minorías: 
el caso de la minoría alemana en Polonia
Resumen 
La protección de las minorías en Europa Central se convirtió en un tema muy contro-
versial durante el período que siguió a la Primera Guerra Mundial. La presencia de una 
minoría alemana considerable, en lo que se había convertido en territorio polaco tras 
la firma del Tratado de Versalles, resultó ventajosa tanto para los extremistas políticos 
de la derecha de la anti-Weimar alemana como para los polacos nacionalistas cuando 
vieron la oportunidad de utilizar el tema de las minorías como una herramienta para el 
revisionismo. Este artículo argumenta que las fuerzas democráticas y republicanas no 
utilizaron el problema de las minorías como una herramienta directa para el expansio-
nismo alemán en Europa Oriental, sin desconocer que ciertos objetivos revisionistas 
fueron de hecho perseguidos por los gobiernos de Weimar.
Palabras clave: República de Weimar, protección de las minorías, Alemania, Polonia, 
Stresemann, Sociedad de las Naciones.
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A política externa da Alemanha de Weimar e da protecção das minorias: o 
caso da minoria alemã na Polônia
Resumo 
A protecção das minorias na Europa Central tornou-se uma questão muito controversa 
durante o período após a Primeira Guerra Mundial. A presença de uma minoria alemã 
significativa no que havia se tornado território polonês após a assinatura do Tratado de 
Versalhes, foi vantajoso para ambos os extremistas políticos sobre o direito de a Weimar 
alemão como poloneses anti-nacionalistas quando eles viram a oportunidade usando o 
tema das minorias como uma ferramenta para o revisionismo. Este artigo argumenta 
que as forças democráticas e republicanas não usou a questão das minorias como uma 
ferramenta direta para o expansionismo alemão na Europa Oriental, embora recon-
heça que certos objetivos revisionistas foram efectivamente exercidas pelos governos 
de Weimar.
Palavras-chave: República de Weimar, protecção das minorías, Alemanha, Polônia, 
Stresemann, Sociedade das Nações.
La politique étrangère de l’Allemagne de Weimar et la protection des minori-
tés: le cas de la minorité allemande en Pologne
Résumé
La protection des minorités en Europe centrale est devenue une question très contro-
versée au cours de la période suivant la Première Guerre mondiale. La présence d’une 
importante minorité allemande dans ce qui était devenu le territoire polonais après la 
signature du traité de Versailles, était avantageux pour les deux extrémistes politiques sur 
le droit de la Weimar allemand Polonais anti-nationalistes quand ils ont vu l’occasion en 
utilisant le thème des minorités comme un outil pour révisionnisme. Cet article soutient 
que les forces démocratiques et républicaines n’ont pas utilisé la question des minorités 
comme un moyen direct pour l’expansionnisme allemand en Europe de l’Est, tout en 
reconnaissant que certains objectifs révisionnistes ont été effectivement exercées par les 
gouvernements de Weimar.
Mots-clés: République de Weimar, protection des minorités, Allemagne, Pologne, Stre-
semann, Ligue des Nations.
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inTroduCTion
The protection of  minorities was a key theme in European and, particular-
ly, German-Polish relations after World War One. The post-war order was 
envisaged to revitalise, as well as strengthen, the conduct of  internatio-
nal relations. Providing a minority protection system in the newly created 
states of  Eastern Europe was an essential component of  reconciling the 
peoples of  Europe. Despite a successful military campaign in Eastern Eu-
rope, Germany was forced to hand over areas of  land to the newly created 
minority state of  Poland. The fate of  the German minority was soon to 
become particularly relevant. Furthermore, the minority issue proved to 
become a disappointing political chapter for Weimar foreign policy. 
In a nutshell, this paper deals with the conflict brought about by the exis-
tence of  a sizeable German minority that lived in the newly created state 
of  Poland. Matters were complicated by Germany’s support for the mi-
nority and political controversy between the League of  Nations and Ger-
many, as well as Poland. What motivated German policy-makers to engage 
with the minority problem, and how can the issue be placed in the wider 
context of  Weimar foreign policy? As will be seen, debates about territory, 
minorities, and the right of  self-determination are deeply intertwined1.
Following this introductory section mapping out the tenets of  internatio-
nal relations in post-World War One Europe with special emphasis upon 
the minorities problem, I will provide an overview of  both sources used 
and the historiography. The subsequent section will sketch out the key 
issues of  the international minority protection system as a responsibility 
of  the League of  Nations. Furthermore, successive Weimar governments’ 
policy of  supporting the German minorities deserves closer attention. I 
will also discuss Germany’s entry into the League of  Nations and in this 
context the tenure of  Gustav Stresemann as German Foreign Secretary. 
Relations between Germany and Poland will be dealt with on various oc-
casions throughout this paper. In the final section, a conclusion will be 
drawn as to the nature of  the minority protection system and the main 
1 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 1918-1926 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 107.
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objectives pursued by Weimar foreign policy-makers regarding the Ger-
man minorities in Poland. 
I argue that Weimar Germany did not use the minority problem as a direct 
tool for expansionism in Eastern Europe. However, certain revisionist 
objectives were indeed pursued and the minority issue was a bargaining 
factor of  utmost importance in Germany’s dealings with Poland. 
1.  The MinoriTy issue and WeiMar foreign poliCy
The World War One shake-up significantly changed the European geopoli-
tical landscape so that the map, especially in the East, revealed noteworthy 
shifts compared to the pre-1914 situation. The defeated Central Powers 
of  Germany and Austria-Hungary suffered sizeable territorial losses, 
which scarred their national psyches. Commenting in 1921, a contempo-
rary analyst observed that a: “redistribution of  territory was taking place, 
far larger than any that had been dealt with on previous occasions. […] [T]
wo new States were being created, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia”2.
Whereas before 1914 Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian imperial 
rule had extended over Central and Eastern Europe, the post-1918 situa-
tion was markedly different. Various ethnic minority groups were assigned 
to live in different states and were expected to shift their political loyalties. 
In fact: “there were German communities in twenty-one of  the thirty-one 
European states”3. Those small to medium-sized states could at any time 
be confronted with revisionist territorial claims by a still powerful Ger-
many4 in its self-proclaimed role as guardian of  the German minority’s 
cultural autonomy5.
2 Harold Temperley, “The Treaties for the Protection of  Minorities”, en A History of  the Peace Conference 
of  Paris, Vol. V, Economic Reconstruction and Protection of  Minorities, ed. Harold Temperley (Londres: 
Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), 120.
3 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann – Weimar’s Greatest Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 471.
4 Eberhard Kolb, Gustav Stresemann (Múnich: Beck, 2003), 96; Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Repub-
lik von Weimar (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 80.
5 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 58.
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Furthermore, following the war, the victorious powers intended to create 
more stable political conditions in Europe. This included not only a re-
mapping of  hitherto existing borders but also a pledge of  self-determi-
nation for the various national groupings on the European continent and 
for an independent Polish State. These issues formed an important part 
of  the peace programme consisting of  fourteen points that the United 
States President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed to Congress on January 8th, 
1918. However, the straightforward nature of  laudable intentions was not 
matched by a viable set of  conditions on the ground. In Eastern and Sou-
th-Eastern Europe especially, German and Jewish minorities had formed 
a constituent part of  the resident population for a long period of  time.
Moreover, any attempt at redrawing frontiers would cause grievances 
owing to the impossibility of  separating the various ethnic minorities in 
Eastern Europe6; i.e. the “centuries-old mixture of  nationalities in central 
and Eastern Europe” proved extremely difficult to resolve7. Thus, even 
though the victorious allies endorsed the Polish, Czech, Slovak and other 
nationalities’ right of  self-determination, it was equally recognized that 
the protection of  minorities existing within their territories had to be en-
sured. Therefore, a number of  minority treaties were consequently agreed 
upon and the League of  Nations was expected to provide a forum for the 
peaceful settlement of  possible future disputes. Such legal instruments 
stipulating the protection of  minorities constituted an absolute novelty 
in the realm of  global politics8. The provision of  a system of  minority 
protection was welcomed. However, as will be seen, grievances among mi-
nority groups were not necessarily dealt with accordingly and satisfactorily.
The so-called Polish Corridor cut off  East Prussia from the rest of  Weimar 
Germany’s territory while Poland was granted access to the Baltic Sea for 
reasons of  economic survival9. A member of  the French delegation in Pa-
ris observed that: “[w]ithout access to the sea, Poland would be stifled”10. 
6 Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik (Fráncfort del Meno: Suhrkamp, 1987), 199.
7 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 471.
8 Carole Fink, “Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 1924-29”, Journal of  Contemporary History 14: 3 (1979): 
404.
9 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 404.
10 “Foreign Relations of  the United States, Paris Peace Conference (a partir de ahora FRUS)”, Vol IV, 
19 de marzo de 1919, 414. Nueva York, NY, Estados Unidos: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969.
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The approximately 1.4 million strong German minority living “in lands 
which Poland acquired from Imperial Germany”11 remained an important 
group in the social fabric of  the Polish State. In conjunction with their 
economic significance, the relatively large number of  Germans12 was seen 
to have a destabilising effect on the Polish polity13. Furthermore, there 
were reports of  the Polish authorities violating the German minority’s 
rights14. In this context, a contemporary witness mentioned forced liqui-
dations of  property, for instance15. On the other hand, the Polish minority 
in the Weimar Republic suffered from “unplanned and unofficial” acts of  
“discrimination”16.
Throughout the lifetime of  the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), consecuti-
ve German governments pursued a double-edged policy of  presenting 
themselves as legitimate guardians of  minority rights, while also trying 
to leave open the door to regain territory in, and influence over, that part 
of  Eastern Europe that had been lost as a result of  the war. It could be 
argued that Germany did indeed have the ability to regain a position of  
great influence in the post-war world order17. Active support of  German 
minorities appeared to be a suitable means to weaken the Polish State and 
to exert such influence. 
Moreover, Weimar governments tended to carefully distinguish between 
the rather conciliatory conduct of  foreign policy towards the victorious 
powers of  Britain and France, and more vehement policies directed 
towards countries along Germany’s eastern frontier. Diplomatic success 
in the west would provide increased political leverage in relations with 
Poland. At the same time, any sign of  a successful revision of  the Versai-
lles Treaty would weaken the anti-Weimar nationalistic German Right and 
strengthen the pro-republican, democratic forces.
11 Richard Blanke, “The German Minority in Inter-War Poland and German Foreign Policy – Some 
Reconsiderations”, Journal of  Contemporary History 25: 1 (1990): 88.
12 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 1918-1933 (Londres: John Hopkins Press, 1971), 206.
13 “Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (a partir de ahora DBFP)”, Serie IA, Vol V, no. 53. 
Londres, Reino Unido: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966.
14 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 194-195.
15 Albrecht Duwe, Damerau – Dorf  und seine Umgebung im Fordoner Weichselbogen, Schicksal von Land und 
Leuten durch die Zeiten (Essen: Albrecht Duwe, 1986), 113.
16 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 195.
17 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 80.
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Furthermore, one needs to consider the interconnectedness of  German 
foreign policy with events occurring in the domestic political domain. An 
overwhelmingly large share of  the electorate expected Weimar govern-
ments to pursue a policy of  revision18 and to demonstrate the unfeasibility 
of  the Versailles Treaty stipulations19. Focusing primarily on the eastern 
frontier, actively supporting Germans living beyond the Reich’s borders and 
guarding German culture against attempts as assimilation by the Polish 
government was seen as vital20. Therefore, financial and political support 
was channelled to the minorities through a network of  organizations and 
governmental bodies21. 
In the arena of  domestic politics too tensions arose between the federal 
government and the Länder (federal states). The issue at stake was over 
which layer of  government in the federal structure of  Germany was to 
be responsible for the conduct of  minority policy. Overall it is crucial to 
remember that the minority question represented only one set of  obsta-
cles German foreign policy needed to face. Further issues that Weimar 
governments pursued included reparations, the Anschluß (unification with 
Austria), the claim to territory lost to Belgium, France, Lithuania, as well 
as Poland, and the withdrawal of  allied troops from the Rhineland. Even 
radical nationalist political circles had realized that a speedy recovery of  
lost territories, particularly in the West, had become almost impossible; the 
minority question, however, constituted an opportunity for the recovery 
of  influence in the east22. 
The ceding of  large parts of  the Prussian provinces of  West Prussia, Poz-
nania, and Eastern Upper Silesia to Poland under the stipulation of  the 
Versailles Treaty fuelled especially harsh sentiments against France and its 
eastern ally Poland amongst the German electorate and in particular the 
German Right. Moreover, the important seaport of  Gdańsk on the Baltic 
coast was placed under a League of  Nations mandate and thus created yet 
18 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 80.
19 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 133.
20 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 92.
21 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik. Die Subventionierung der 
deutschen Minderheit in Polen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1973), 11.
22 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 92.
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another locus of  dispute between Germans and Poles. The new demo-
cracies of  Eastern Europe soon proved to be unstable political systems 
and rising nationalistic tendencies subsequently worsened the situation of  
minority groups23. The failures of  parliamentary democracy in Poland be-
came apparent by Józef  Piłsudski’s coup d’état in May 192624.
Germany’s recognition of  crucial security guarantees vis-à-vis its western 
neighbour and long-time rival France constituted a novelty in post-war 
foreign policy25. Despite being a victor of  World War One, France was in 
need of  an Eastern European ally, as Bolshevik Russia could not be relied 
upon26. Therefore, France had an interest in securing a strong position 
for the new Polish State to counterbalance a possibly resurgent German 
hegemony over Eastern Europe27. The policy went as far as to actually 
“supervise” the foreign policy of  Poland28. Weimar governments quickly 
realised the necessity of  establishing sound and stable relations with Fran-
ce, who was the most ardent supporter of  the Rhineland occupation. The 
occupation infuriated the German public. 
Britain, France’s counterpart in the Entente Cordiale (1904) attempted to 
limit German territorial loss at the Paris Peace Conference “but […] did 
not achieve much” in terms of  satisfying French security needs29. In fact, 
in the course of  the 1920s Britain and France were at odds on a number 
of  issues concerning territorial arrangements in Eastern Europe30 such as 
the controversy over Upper Silesia in 192131, and the adequate treatment 
of  German minorities in Poland32. Furthermore, cordial relations with the 
23 Hans Mommsen, Aufstieg und Untergang der Republik von Weimar (Berlin: Ullstein, 2003), 138.
24 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat? Deutschland und der Minderheitenschutz (Marburg, Lahn: Jo-
hann-Gottfried-Herder-Institut, 1988), 26.
25 Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 197.
26 Hans Mommsen, Aufstieg und Untergang, 137.
27 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 112.
28 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 92.
29 Francis Carsten, Britain and the Weimar Republic (Londres: Batsford Academic and Education, 1984), 
27.
30 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 134.
31 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 135.
32 Francis Carsten, Britain and the Weimar Republic, 73; Christian Höltjen, Die Weimarer Republik und das 
Ostlocarno-Problem, 1919-1934, Revision oder Garantie der deutschen Ostgrenze von 1919 (Würzburg: Holzner 
Verlag, 1958), 141.
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United States were crucial to Germany’s economic recovery. According 
to German Reich Chancellor Hans Luther, with “global public opinion” fa-
vourable to Germany, American financial resources could be successfully 
tapped33. 
On the other hand, during the early years of  the Weimar Republic a faction 
of  German foreign policy-makers advocated political and economic coo-
peration with Soviet Russia whilst also pursuing revisionist aims and focu-
sing less on a settlement with the western war allies34. Relations with the 
Soviet Union were conducted carefully, however, owing to the Soviet su-
pport for international communist revolutionary movements35. The trea-
ties of  Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926) between Germany and the Soviet 
Union represented such instances of  diplomatic cooperation. Regarding 
political relations with Poland, it is worth stressing that the Soviet Union 
was involved in a bellicose conflict with Poland in the direct aftermath of  
World War One. Any rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet 
Union must have caused concern in Warsaw.
When assessing Weimar foreign policy, it is crucial to focus on the poli-
cies of  Gustav Stresemann. The leader of  the right of  centre, national 
liberal DVP – Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party) briefly acted 
as chancellor (August 3rd, 1923– November 30th, 1923) before heading the 
Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) uninterruptedly from Novem-
ber 30th, 1923 until his premature death on October 3rd, 1929 abruptly en-
ded the “Stresemann era”36. Stresemann was also said to have left his mark 
in the domestic realm of  politics by attempting to stabilise the Weimar 
system37. The period from 1918 to the year of  Stresemann’s passing will 
be set as the temporal scope of  the analysis presented in this paper. After 
Stresemann’s death, German foreign policy-makers soon began to pursue 
a more confrontational style entailing also ramifications for the minority 
question38.
33 “Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik, Das Kabinett Luther II, 1”, Boppard, Rin, Alemania: 
Harald Boldt Verlag, 1970, 859; traducción propia.
34 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 79; Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 272.
35 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 115.
36 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 207, traducción propia.
37 Eberhard Kolb, Gustav Stresemann, 118-119.
38 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League of  Nations (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1976), 
149; Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 513.
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Key foreign policy decisions, that proved unpopular in right wing quarters, 
fall into Stresemann’s tenure as foreign secretary. These include the signing 
of  the Locarno Treaty and Germany’s entry into the League of  Nations. 
The Foreign Secretary was always careful to point out that the Locarno 
Treaty did not imply recognition of  Germany’s border with Poland39. He 
stressed cordial relations with Britain and France, however. Moreover, Lo-
carno would: “[increase] accommodation by [Stresemann’s] Western part-
ners to a campaign by Germany for the expansion of  minority rights”40. 
Stresemann followed a policy of: “[securing Germany’s] détente with the 
West as well as to facilitate her economic recovery”41. The term “détente” 
is understood to imply: “a relaxation or a slackening of  tension in the 
previously strained relations between states”42. Like many of  his contem-
poraries, Stresemann was harshly critical of  large parts of  the Versailles 
Treaty, particularly in regard to the harmful ramifications of  the nature of  
the German-Polish frontier43. Despite very aggressive demands made du-
ring the war regarding Germany’s territorial expansion, Stresemann later 
occupied the political centre during the Weimar period44. Finally, the DVP 
leader had particularly close relations with representatives of  German mi-
nority groups45 and listed minority protection among the three key aims 
of  Weimar foreign policy46. 
Having attempted to fit the issue of  the German minority in Poland into 
the broader canvas of  the post-World War One European political order, 
the focus of  this paper now turns to dealing with the historiography of  
Weimar foreign policy with special regard to the German minority in Po-
land.
39 “Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945 (a partir de ahora ADAP)”, Serie B, X, Anexo 
II, presumiblemente redactado por Stresemann a finales de diciembre de 1928. Göttingen, Alemania: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1966-1979, 612.
40 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 406.
41 Carole Fink, “Defender of  Minorities: Germany in the League of  Nations, 1926-1933”, Central Eu-
ropean History 5: 4 (1972): 338.
42 Graham Evans y Richard Newnham, Dictionary of  International Relations (Londres: Penguin, 1998), 
125.
43 “ADAP”, Serie B, X, Anexo II, presumiblemente redactado por Stresemann a finales de diciembre de 1928, 612.
44 Eberhard Kolb, Gustav Stresemann, 118.
45 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 206.
46 Henry Bernhard, Gustav Stresemann – Vermächtnis, Die Aufgaben deutscher Aussenpolitik, Stresemann an den 
ehemaligen Kronprinzen, 07 de septiembre de 1925 (Berlin: Ullstein, 1932), 553.
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2. sourCes used and noTes on hisToriography
Early post-World War Two historians studied the minority question in the 
light of  German territorial and economic expansionism in Eastern Euro-
pe. The German historian Fritz Fischer published extensively on what he 
claimed to be a continuation of  expansionist German policy during the 
Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic (as embodied in Stresemann’s foreign 
policy) culminating in Hitler’s ruthless war aims in Eastern Europe47. Mo-
reover, Gatzke had access to German Foreign Office papers at an early 
stage. He attributes to Stresemann’s agenda the “ultimate aims” of  pro-
viding security for Germans abroad and a “readjustment of  the Eastern 
Frontier”48. Turner, on the other hand, criticises Fischer’s claim that the 
goal of  Stresemann’s minority policy was to demand a German State that 
would accommodate all people of  German ethnicity in Central Europe; 
Fischer’s approach establishes neither a thorough analysis of  Stresemann’s 
foreign policy nor, more specifically, his minority policy49. According to 
Turner, Stresemann did not show distinctive hegemonic ambitions50. 
For the first time, Fink and Pieper deal with aspects of  the minority issue 
in more detail. In a nutshell, Pieper does not detect a “strategic plan” in 
Weimar Germany’s minority policy51. As opposed to the Third Reich po-
licy of  a “revolutionary change of  the Versailles order”, Weimar foreign 
policy aimed at accomplishing “evolutionary” shifts52. Fink argues that 
Stresemann’s minority policies were not motivated by expansionist goals 
but rather by political point-scoring against nationalistic anti-Weimar for-
ces within Germany53. According to Fink, Stresemann tended to mediate 
between gaining the approval of  German public opinion and sending con-
47 Fritz Fischer, Griff  nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914-1918 (Düs-
seldorf: Droste, 1964), 862.
48 Hans Gatzke, Stresemann and the rearmament of  Germany (Londres: John Hopkins Press, 1965), 113.
49 Henry Turner, “Stresemann und das Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Außenpolitik seit 
1871” en Grundfragen der deutschen Außenpolitik seit 1871, ed. Gilbert Ziebura (Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), 289; Christian Höltjen, Die Weimarer Republik, 102-103.
50 Henry Turner, Stresemann und das Problem der Kontinuität, 296.
51 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage und das Deutsche Reich, 1919-1933/34 (Hamburgo: Institut für 
Internationale Angelegenheiten, 1974), 336.
52 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 338.
53 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 40.
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ciliatory messages to the western allies. However, such a volatile course 
of  action in minority issues would not be suitable for a revisionist policy 
towards the eastern frontier54. Thus Fink and Pieper’s analyses are not in 
accordance with Fischer’s view of  a continuation of  expansionist German 
foreign policy in regard to Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, Krekeler investigates the very specific aspect of  a system of  
subsidies granted to German minorities and administered by the Auswär-
tiges Amt. The author arrives at the conclusion that the partly secret ne-
twork of  Weimar political parties, parliamentarians, governmental bodies, 
and representatives of  minorities: “was an essential precondition for the 
Volkstumspolitik of  the Third Reich”55. Thus Krekeler does not specifically 
construe a relationship between minority policies and territorial expan-
sionism, but highlights the nexus of  certain revisionist demands and the 
Reich’s interest in perpetuating German cultural identity in parts of  Poland. 
Moreover, Schot investigates why Stresemann devoted a fair amount of  
his time in office to the minority issue, at a time when the Reich had a 
greater interest in attracting foreign capital by means of  seeking a closer 
relationship with the western allies56. The answer could again be found in 
domestic politics. According to Schot, Stresemann intended to weaken 
the DNVP – Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People’s Party) 
by appealing to nationalistic sentiments57. After the fall of  Weimar, Third 
Reich policy quickly lost the moral standing gained in the Stresemann era58.
Additionally, the most recent scholarly contribution to the issue of  Ger-
man minorities in Poland during the Weimar years deals very specifically 
with the minority protection system under the auspices of  the League 
of  Nations. Raitz von Frentz investigates: “the question of  whether the 
[minority protection system] failed due to its conceptual, institutional and 
procedural flaws or because of  a deterioration of  the political environ-
54 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 41.
55 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 150; traducción propia.
56 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 250.
57 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 251.
58 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 258.
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ment”59. Furthermore, the author raises questions about: “how well [the 
minority protection system] responded to the double challenge posed by 
Polish integral nationalism and German revisionism”60.
On a more general note, Krüger’s analysis of  Weimar foreign policy is 
probably one of  the most prolific studies published so far by a German 
scholar. Regarding attempts to revise Versailles, Krüger asks whether the 
avoidance of  such a policy could have been a realistic expectation of  any 
German government so soon after the war. Public hostility towards the se-
ttlement and the existence of  stipulations demanded of  the Weimar state 
created “political unity” amongst the German population61. Furthermore, 
Krüger strongly doubts claims that Stresemann would have pursued “a 
more active policy of  revision towards the east” following the Rhineland 
occupation62.
Primary source material is drawn from British, German, and United Sta-
tes foreign office papers, papers from the Reichskanzlei, and transcripts of  
Reichstag debates, as well as newspaper publications. 
3. MinoriTy proTeCTion under The league of naTions
On January 25th, 1919 delegates at the Paris Peace Conference called for 
the creation of  the League of  Nations. Proponents of  the international 
organization trusted the League to ensure the execution of  the peace trea-
ties arrived at in Paris63. According to the Versailles Treaty, one of  the 
League’s responsibilities was to protect: “the educational, cultural, and re-
ligious rights of  the German minorities in the new states in eastern Euro-
pe”64. However, the treaty did not make special provisions on the minority 
issue, so that a further legal settlement between the allied powers and Po-
59 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection under the League of  Nations, The Case of  
the German Minority in Poland, 1920-1934 (Hamburgo: LIT, Arbeiten zur Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol 
8, 1999), 2.
60 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 3.
61 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 80-81, traducción propia.
62 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 504, traducción propia.
63 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 102.
64 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League, 23.
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land would be required65. Article 93 of  the Versailles Treaty provided for 
that future arrangement66.
The impossibility of  assigning each nationality to a separate state had be-
come clear, so that minorities were to enjoy guaranteed rights and pro-
tection67. The League Covenant did not make any special provision for 
a minority protection system, but a set of  treaties for the protection of  
minorities was concluded “in great haste at the end of  the Peace Confe-
rence”68 in 1919 and 1920, gearing the League towards acting as a power 
guaranteeing minority rights69. The minority treaty with Poland was signed 
on June 28th, 1919. In the words of  Woodrow Wilson, the aim of  the Paris 
Peace Conference with regard to minorities was the attempt: “to make 
a peaceful settlement, […], to eliminate those elements of  disturbance, 
so far as possible, which may interfere with the peace of  the world, and 
[…] to make an equitable distribution of  territories according to the race, 
the ethnographical character of  the people inhabiting those territories”70. 
President Wilson continued by stating that: “nothing, […], is more likely 
to disturb the peace of  the world than the treatment which might […] be 
meted out to minorities”71.
In a written communication to the German delegation, first Georges Cle-
menceau, French Prime Minister and President of  the Peace Conference, 
highlighted the “special obligation” the war allies had to: “re-establish the 
Polish Nation in the independence of  which it was unjustly deprived more 
than one hundred years ago”72. This highly ambitious claim alone was 
difficult to put into practice successfully. One French diplomat explained 
65 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 6.
66 The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Tratado de Versailles, 28 de junio de 
1919, Sección XIII, Artículo 93 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2014), consultado el 02 de junio de 
2014, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partiii.asp.
67 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 5.
68 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 1.
69 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 108.
70 Woodrow Wilson, “President Wilson’s Speech at the Plenary Session of  the Peace Conference, 31 de 
mayo de 1919” en A History of  the Peace Conference of  Paris, Vol. V, Economic Reconstruction and Protection 
of  Minorities, ed. Harold Temperley (Londres: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), 130.
71 Woodrow Wilson, President Wilson’s Speech, 130.
72 “FRUS”, Vol VI, 16 de junio de 1919, 945.
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that the inhabitants “[were] very mixed as was usual in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, adding that: “the frontier adopted […] gave the Poles less than 
they asked for”73. Thus the territorial settlement arrived at would neither 
satisfy the Poles nor their western neighbours74. To Stresemann, finding a 
settlement of  the German-Polish frontier issue was: “probably the most 
important challenge of  European politics”75.
Stressing the “endeavours and sacrifices” of  the western powers that led 
to the creation of  Poland, as well as the vital role those powers would 
in future times assume regarding her security, Clemenceau articulated his 
strong conviction that minority issues are best placed in the hands of  the 
League of  Nations, as opposed to remaining the western powers’ sole 
responsibility76. Hence, article 12 of  the Polish minority treaty77 firstly, 
decoupled the protection of  minorities from the political interests of  a 
single power, and secondly, placed the issue into the arena of  international 
politics78. The minority treaty was to be inextricably linked to the “esta-
blishment of  the Polish State”79 and to act as a cornerstone of  peaceful 
relations among European nations80. 
The Poles saw a special minority treaty such as was drawn up by the war 
allies as meddling with Polish domestic politics81 and an “[infringement] 
on their sovereignty”82. The treaty was seen to be motivated by political 
rather than judicial, or even idealistic, considerations83. In 1921 Temperley 
noted that, unlike Poland, Germany “was [not] subjected to an invidious 
73 “FRUS”, Vol IV, 19 de marzo de 1919, 413; Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 114.
74 Ralph Schattkowsky, Deutschland und Polen von 1918/19 bis 1925 (Fráncfort del Meno: Peter Lang, 
1994), 59.
75 “ADAP”, Serie B, II, i, no. 150, 19 de abril de 1926, 363; traducción propia.
76 Georges Clemenceau, “Letter of  Clemenceau to Paderewski, 24 de junio de 1919”, en A History of  
the Peace Conference of  Paris, Vol. V, Economic Reconstruction and Protection of  Minorities, ed. Harold Tem-
perley (Londres: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), 434.
77 “Poland Minorities Treaty, 28 de junio de 1919”, en A History of  the Peace Conference of  Paris, Vol. V, 
Economic Reconstruction and Protection of  Minorities, ed. Harold Temperley (Londres: Henry Frowde and 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), 442.
78 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 9.
79 Harold Temperley, The Treaties for the Protection, 133.
80 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 8.
81 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League, 132.
82 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League, 132; Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 35.
83 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 7.
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control of  its internal affairs”84, even though a minority of  1.2 million 
people, most of  them Poles and Danes, resided in Germany85. The loss 
of  territory: “had virtually eliminated [Germany’s] internal minorities”86. 
Moreover, there was no minority treaty with Italy, despite the presence of  
a German minority in South Tyrol, for instance87.
Consequently, it could be argued that the Poles were justified in specu-
lating about the double standards applied by the war allies. At the same 
time, Polish: “sovereignty […] depended on the co-operation of  the great 
powers”88. However, if  a more peaceful Europe was to be created, the 
protection of  minorities could not simply remain a laudable goal, but nee-
ded to be based on a judicial framework that would provide the minorities 
with an appropriate venue to express their grievances. Moreover, placing 
the protection of  Germans in Poland onto the international, rather than 
a bilateral, agenda89 by means of  a treaty was welcomed in Germany90 and 
meant: “a new era in minority rights”91. A minority treaty had essentially 
to strike: “the delicate balance between legitimate leadership and hegemo-
nic imposition [casting] doubts on the practicality of  collective security in 
principle”92. 
Interestingly, commenting on the proceedings of  the Paris Peace Confe-
rence in more general terms, a high-ranking British official criticised the 
American delegation in particular for “developing utopian plans” for Eu-
rope93. The statement expressed a sense of  bitterness felt over the ill-sui-
ted nature of  some arrangements arrived at after the war and the state of  
European affairs during the 1920s generally. 
A case in point was the inconsistent application of  the Wilsonian “self-de-
84 Harold Temperley, The Treaties for the Protection, 141.
85 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 109.
86 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 332.
87 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 7.
88 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 66.
89 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 9.
90 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 108.
91 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 332.
92 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 6.
93 “ADAP”, Serie B, I, i, no. 173, 19 de marzo de 1926, 421; traducción propia.
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termination principle”, as was the case with large parts of  the German 
minority in Poland, for instance94. Moreover, the minority issue was “left 
[…] with a fatal legacy” following the American refusal to ratify the pea-
ce settlement95. According to a British diplomat, European political and 
economic reconstruction depended on American power96. America’s war 
allies accepted “a little local suffering”97 of  minorities as a result: “of  the 
new order in Eastern Europe”98. 
It should be emphasized that Germany did not become a member of  the 
League of  Nations until September 1926. Hence Weimar governments 
could not participate in League procedures, including the minority issue, 
and pursued: “a defensive […] policy on minorities”99. The allied powers 
had already given assurances to Germany over the protection of  minori-
ties100. Poland, on the other hand, had been a founding member of  the Lea-
gue and had fought hard for a permanent council seat101. Fink claims that 
Britain and France backed: “Poland’s application for a permanent Council 
seat to neutralize Germany’s presence”102. However, a British diplomat 
directly disputed Fink’s analysis. Tyrrell argued that France supported the 
Polish bid, so that Germany and her eastern neighbour could cooperate in 
the League and free France from the responsibility of  arguing on Poland’s 
behalf103. 
Minorities were provided with the opportunity to raise awareness of  mis-
treatment by means of  a system of  petitions that could be addressed to 
a council member state104. Article 12 of  the minority treaty with Poland 
stipulated that “any Member of  the Council of  the League of  Nations 
94 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 35.
95 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 72.
96 “ADAP”, Serie B, I, i, no. 173, 19 de marzo de 1926, 421.
97 Geza Paikert, “Hungary’s National Minority Policies, 1920-1945”, American Slavic and East European 
Review 12:2 (1953): 210-218, como citado en Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 335.
98 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 335.
99 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League, 135.
100 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 10. 
101 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League, 78.
102 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 338.
103 “ADAP”, Serie B, I, i, no. 173, Tyrrell al embajador alemán en Londres Sthamer, 19 de marzo de 1926, 419.
104 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 7.
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shall have the right to bring to the attention of  the Council any infraction, 
or any danger of  infraction”105 of  a minority’s rights. The petition system’s 
procedures were criticised for alleged secrecy106, and international opinion 
strongly doubted the League’s ability to act as a guardian of  minorities107. 
Furthermore, officials of  a League member state “[having] an immediate 
[…] interest in a particular minority dispute” were barred from participa-
ting in a council session on such a minority issue108. The League’s General 
Secretary Sir E. Drummond communicated the unwelcome council de-
cision to the Secretary of  State in the Auswärtiges Amt, von Schubert109. 
Hence the council placed a limit on German influence in December 1925 
shortly before the Weimar Republic entered the League110. From Strese-
mann’s point of  view, this was proof  of  the allies’ “fear” regarding future 
German membership111. Furthermore, consonant with minority represen-
tatives, Germany supported notions of  cultural autonomy coupled with 
loyalty towards the new homeland, as opposed to the policy of  minority 
assimilation clearly favoured by the western allies112. 
The minority groups soon called for a stronger role for their representati-
ves113. The League Secretariat denied demands to that effect; the minority 
treaty would not cover such forms of  participation114. Moreover, minority 
representatives were not granted the same legal status as possessed by a 
state115. Hence, German minorities would almost inevitably have to turn 
to the Weimar government in order to increase their influence on the dea-
lings of  the League116. 
105 “Poland Minorities Treaty, 28 de junio de 1919”, 442.
106 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 224.
107 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 10.
108 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 224.
109 “DBFP”, Serie 1A, I, no. 276, 16 de febrero de 1926, 438-439.
110 “Britain and France reach agreement on Disarmament”, The New York Times, Nueva York, NY, 10 de 
diciembre de 1925.
111 “ADAP”, Serie B, I, i, Anexo II, 14 de diciembre de 1925, 751; traducción propia.
112 “ADAP”, Serie B, II, i, no. 21, 73-74; “Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik, Das Kabinett 
Müller II”, 1, no. 137, note 3, Boppard, Rin, Alemania: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1970, 452-453.
113 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 12.
114 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 12.
115 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 13.
116 Helmut Pieper, Die Minderheitenfrage, 13.
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4. gerMany in The league of naTions
Having established the key tenets of  the international minority protection 
system, I now analyse the steps Germany took on becoming a member of  
the League.
In early February 1926 the German cabinet unanimously agreed on a note 
to apply for entry into the League of  Nations117. Called the self-styled 
“protector of  minorities”118 by the New York Times in December 1925, 
Germany entered the League nine months later. Membership was pur-
sued “despite […] resistance abroad”119 and domestic opposition during a 
Reichstag debate in November 1925120, as well as reservations voiced in the 
Free State of  Bavaria and a number of  other Länder121. In a similar vain, 
the right-wing German press accused Stresemann of  an “uncontrolled” 
rush into the League122. 
One needs to bear in mind the importance of  the League of  Nations, for 
the international organization was designed as the venue at which to settle 
minority issues123. Stresemann realized the advantages League members-
hip would yield for German foreign policy and his own standing in the 
domestic political arena. “[W]hen wielded skilfully and with restraint”, the 
minority issue would present Germany as a proponent of  “Wilsonianism” 
as well as strengthen the badly needed sense of  political unity within the 
Weimar system124. 
Stresemann was optimistic about the opportunities German membership 
117 Henry Bernhard, Gustav Stresemann – Vermächtnis, Vol II, Das Eintritts-Ersuchen (Berlin: Ullstein, 1932), 
557.
118 “Britain and France reach agreement on Disarmament”, The New York Times, Nueva York, NY, 10 de 
diciembre de 1925.
119 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 338.
120 “Verhandlungen des Reichstages”, Sesión 124, Vol 388, 24 de noviembre de 1925, 4496, archivo en 
línea.
121 Henry Bernhard, Gustav Stresemann – Vermächtnis, Vol II, Bayrische Bedenken (Berlin: Ullstein, 1932), 
557.
122 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 495.
123 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 466.
124 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 407-408.
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would provide for the settlement of  the minority issue and made ample 
use of  the argument to convince and persuade the electorate125. Only by 
participation in the League could Germany contribute to the transfor-
mation of  European politics126. This could only be in the interest of  the 
Germans living outside the Reich’s frontiers127. 
Stresemann confidently expressed such optimism during an applauded 
speech to minority representatives in December 1925128. The Foreign Se-
cretary and DVP leader wisely used such occasions to gain: “support for 
his policy against attacks from the DNVP (German National People’s Par-
ty)”129. It is interesting to note that the high-ranking DNVP politician, 
Alfred Hugenberg, had himself  lived and worked in Poznania in pre-war 
times130. However, Wintzer does not fully share Stresemann’s optimism, 
as “effective support for minorities” was only possible with a permanent 
seat on the council131.
Having joined the League, Germany took a back seat with respect to the 
minority problem and thus partly retreated from the role of  protector of  
minorities. The Auswärtiges Amt had been urged by the British Foreign 
Secretary to adhere to this policy for the time being and to build trust 
instead132. Stresemann’s rather passive stance towards the minority issue 
enabled him to achieve “cordial relations with his Council colleagues”, 
including those of  “Minority States”133. Whilst close relations with other 
representatives were definitely advantageous, German diplomats did not 
often encounter colleagues as well informed as themselves about minority 
issues134. 
125 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 441.
126 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 150.
127 “ADAP”, Serie B, I, i, Anexo II, ‘Rede Dr. Stresemanns vor der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Landsmannschaften 
in Gross-Berlin’, 14 de diciembre de 1925, 746.
128 “ADAP”, Serie B, I, i, Anexo II, 751-752.
129 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 343.
130 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 89.
131 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 109; traducción propia.
132 “DBFP”, Serie 1A, I, no. 245, Chamberlain to D’Abernon, 04 de febrero de 1926, 399.
133 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 340.
134 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 117.
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The Auswärtiges Amt had already begun to devise a system of  “clandesti-
ne subsidies”135 supporting German minorities in Poland before Strese-
mann’s tenure136. Moreover, the German Foreign Office had to struggle 
with the Home Office over the competencies regarding adequate financial 
support for German schools, associations, and newspapers that were pri-
mary propaganda tools137. Any dependence of  German minorities on the 
Polish State or Polish banks had to be avoided, so that the minority re-
mained a strong force enabling the Auswärtiges Amt to continue to demand 
territorial revision138. The existence of  a robust German presence would 
also help to undermine the Polish State139. The German Foreign Office 
managed to create secret organizations, as well as the so-called Hollandsche 
Buitenbank in the economically stable Netherlands to channel financial su-
pport to the ceded territories140. Minority associations such as the Deutsche 
Stiftung acted within the Reich to coordinate activities141. 
Motivated also by domestic policy objectives, Stresemann turned his atten-
tion to bringing an end to the French-led occupation of  the Rhineland142 
that was to ensure Germany met her reparations obligations143. The Briti-
sh diplomat G.N. Barnes had already predicted in 1919 that: “[t]he French 
soldiery are probably the least suitable persons […] to occupy German te-
rritory”144. Stresemann did not, however, rest in his attempts to tackle the 
minority problem. He faced further resistance from the Land of  Prussia 
over the issue of  granting cultural autonomy to the mostly Polish minority 
groups living inside the Reich; the struggle would drag on until December 
1928145. Stresemann hoped to lead the minority cause by “[setting] a good 
135 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 466.
136 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 41.
137 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 44-46.
138 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 46; John Hiden, “The Weimar Republic and the Problem of  the 
Auslandsdeutsche”, Journal of  Contemporary History 12:2 (1977): 278.
139 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 305.
140 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 174, 177.
141 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 177.
142 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 466; Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 339-340.
143 Christoph Kimmich, Germany and the League, 118.
144 “FRUS”, Appendix V to CF-61, Vol VI, 10 de junio de 1919, 343.
145 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 407.
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example”146 thus gaining international credibility147.
By 1928, the German government had become the object of  criticism 
due to its allegedly tentative attempts to make headway on the minority 
problem148. Stresemann relied for domestic political support on progress 
in this issue149. The League had received numerous petitions from both 
German and Polish minority representatives and a new procedure was 
sought to deal with the difficult task of  settling disputes in the League150. 
Tensions between Germany and Poland finally erupted at the December 
1928 assembly meeting151. Reacting to a rather harsh speech by the Polish 
Foreign Secretary August Zaleski, Stresemann: “[pounded] his fists on the 
Council table”152. 
Fink claims that: “[t]he Faustschlag marked the close of  Germany’s appren-
tice period in the League, and nineteen twenty-nine became known as ‘the 
year of  minorities”’153. Stresemann proposed a “reform of  existing League 
procedures” and demanded greater involvement of  minority representa-
tives154. The Council did not follow the Weimar Foreign Secretary’s sug-
gestions, however155. Conversely, members of  his own staff  regarded their 
superior’s intervention as a positive step because the minority issue had to 
be pursued further, so that eventually a degree of  territorial revision could 
be achieved156. Stresemann claimed his outburst was motivated by his ini-
tial hopes for the upcoming conclusion of  a trade treaty that would have 
improved German-Polish relations157. Stresemann committed himself  to 
act as Foreign Secretary until the minority problem was settled158. 
146 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 406.
147 Auswärtiges Amt, No. VI a. 65/25, B. 2089, Anexo, ‘Die außenpolitische Notwendigkeit einer den Bedürf-
nissen der deutschen Minderheiten in Europa entsprechende Regelung des Minderheitenrechts innerhalb des Reiches’, 
como citado en Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 292.
148 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 467.
149 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 181.
150 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 410.
151 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 210.
152 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 410.
153 Carole Fink, Stresemann’s Minority Policies, 412.
154 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 470.
155 Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann, 471.
156 “ADAP”, Serie B, XI, no. 73, note 4, 15 de febrero de 1929, 146.
157 “ADAP”, Serie B, X, Anexo II, presumiblemente redactado por Stresemann a finales de diciembre de 1928, 612.
158 Henry Bernhard, Gustav Stresemann – Vermächtnis, Vol III (Berlin: Ullstein, 1933), 438.
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Minority representatives received the Faustschlag (punch) gesture very po-
sitively159. However, in January 1929 Kurt Tucholsky wondered whether 
Stresemann’s emphatic gesture had actually won him a victory, as his pri-
mary goal should have been to impress the representatives at the League 
and not the German public160. Moreover, the German press gave a rather 
cold reception to Stresemann’s efforts at the Council meeting in March 
1928; the negotiations were reported to have been “depressing”161. Yet, 
the mood in the Auswärtiges Amt improved because Stresemann’s more 
forceful efforts in the League would at least for some time weaken the 
“radical nationalistic opposition”162.
5. The gerMan MinoriTy in poland
The importance of  German membership in the League and the difficul-
ties arising from domestic, as well as foreign, policy constraints, is clear 
from the previous discussion. Now the experiences of  German minorities 
under Polish rule require our attention in order to bring specific issues 
regarding the minority problem to light. German minority groups inhabi-
ted the areas of  the so-called Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, as well as the 
former Austrian Galicia and Congress Poland. The fate of  the German 
minority in the Corridor was the most controversial, however, because the 
group was: “the most vocal and active of  all in its revisionist demands”163. 
We learn form the case of  the village of  Damerau how embittered the 
inhabitants were about what they regarded as a violation of  the principle 
of  self-determination proclaimed at Versailles164. The new Polish govern-
ment took actions primarily aimed at reducing the cultural and economic 
foundation of  the village population165. According to Duwe’s account of  
the history of  Damerau, relations between Poles and Germans were not 
159 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 212.
160 Kurt Tucholsky, “Ein Betrunkener in der Wilhelmstraße”, Die Weltbühne, Berlín, 01 de enero de 1929, 
13.
161 “Die Minderheitenfrage vor dem Völkerbundsrat”, Nation und Staat – Deutsche Zeitung für das eu-
ropäische Minderheitenproblem, Berlín, abril de 1929, 441.
162 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 213.
163 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 206.
164 Albrecht Duwe, Damerau, 114.
165 Albrecht Duwe, Damerau, 112.
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particularly bitter. However, political decisions taken by the Polish gover-
nment deeply troubled the German population166. In fact, by 1922 about 
two thirds of  Germans from the former West Prussia and Poznania had 
left for the Reich167. 
It is necessary to provide a brief  account of  developments in Upper Sile-
sia. The future of  the area was also heavily and bitterly contested mainly 
due to its economic importance since: “23 percent of  the total coal output 
of  the German Empire [had been produced]” in the area168. Following a 
plebiscite, Upper Silesia was partitioned into the German (Western Upper 
Silesia) and the Polish (Eastern Upper Silesia). Under international pressu-
re, the opposing sides agreed to sign the Geneva Protocol on Upper Silesia 
(1922)169. The Polish right to exercise their culture and language freely in 
Western Upper Silesia was thus guaranteed170. 
During a German foreign affairs select committee session in 1926, a Cen-
tre Party parliamentarian from Western Upper Silesia, Carl Ulitzka, clai-
med that the German minority would like to be loyal citizens to the Polish 
State provided they could practice their culture freely171. Equally, however, 
Ulitzka described the hardship suffered by the German minority, and the 
effects of  strong Polish propaganda in the run-up to elections172. The Mi-
nority Treaty between the allies and Poland was meant to guarantee the 
rights of  Germans in Eastern Upper Silesia173, which included raising awa-
reness of  mistreatment: “directly to the League Council”174. Von Riekhoff  
166 Albrecht Duwe, Damerau, 115.
167 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 48.
168 “FRUS”, Vol XI, 03 de junio de 1919, 207; Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 134.
169 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 49.
170 Joachim Wintzer, Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 108-109.
171 “Geheimer Rat Dr. Quarck, Bayerische Gesandtschaft in Berlin, an das Bayerische Staatsministerium 
des Äußeren in München, Betreff: Auswärtiger Ausschuß des Reichtags”, 27 de noviembre de 1926, 
en Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Múnich, Abt. Geheimes Staatsarchiv; Politische Berichte, Múnich, 
Alemania.
172 “Geheimer Rat Dr. Quarck, Bayerische Gesandtschaft in Berlin, an das Bayerische Staatsministerium 
des Äußeren in München, Betreff: Auswärtiger Ausschuß des Reichtags”, 27 de noviembre de 1926, 
en Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Múnich, Abt. Geheimes Staatsarchiv; Politische Berichte, Múnich, 
Alemania.
173 Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 49.
174 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 340.
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concludes that: “[never] in an international treaty had so much attention 
been paid to the human element involved”175. 
6.  underlying Tensions: agrarian vs. indusTrial soCieTy and 
The gerMan MinoriTy proBleM
It has been noted that the presence of  a strong and influential German 
minority in the new state of  Poland was of  vital interest to the Weimar 
Republic. According to Raitz von Frentz: “the size of  a minority not only 
determined its electoral success but also its entitlement to public funds 
and, on an international level, its visibility and ability to attract foreign su-
pport”176. The problem of  Germans migrating from the agricultural east 
to the country’s more industrialised western zones had already become 
apparent before the outbreak of  World War One177. During the early Wei-
mar period, matters had deteriorated to the extent that the refugees from 
the east had to be supplied with financial support178. The measure that was 
intended to ease the integration into a new life in the Reich resulted only in 
attracting further German migration from the ceded territories179. 
In pre-war times, the Prussian authorities offered incentives for new sett-
lements in the eastern part of  the Reich180. A French representative at the 
Paris Peace Conference confirmed such efforts; while speaking of  an area 
north of  Poznan, Cambon described the incentives: as “intense German 
colonization that had been pursued of  late years”181. The policies included 
practices such as: “forcible expropriation of  the Poles”182. 
From their strongholds in the German east, conservative political circles 
posed a continuous threat to the Weimar state of  which the Kapp-Putsch 
175 Carole Fink, Defender of  Minorities, 340.
176 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten, 35.
177 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 306.
178 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 48.
179 Norbert Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch, 48.
180 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 306.
181 “FRUS”, Vol IV, 19 de marzo de 1919, 413.
182 “FRUS”, Vol IV, 19 de marzo de 1919, 413.
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(1920) and the Oststaat-Projekt (1919)183 serve as examples184. Consecutive 
Weimar governments subsidised the owners of  large agricultural estates, 
including those situated in the Polish territories after the war185. A case in 
point was Stresemann’s proposal of  large-scale subsidies for East Prussia 
to prevent Germans from leaving the province and to strengthen agricul-
ture186. However, such financial support did not necessarily reach Ger-
man farmers in small communities whose position was further weakened 
by Polish land reforms187. Republican administrations attempted to shield 
themselves from right wing critics by means of  subsidies. Weimar repre-
sentatives were accused of  having given up the claim to West Prussia, as 
well as Poznania188, and in more general terms of  pursuing a policy of  
fulfilment.
The challenge of  encouraging settlements in the east could be regarded as 
a predicament brought about by modernity189. Was Germany to become, 
first and foremost, an industrial society, or would the Weimar Republic be-
nefit from a stronger focus on agriculture?190 Decreasing levels of  imports 
by promoting domestic agricultural activities was a policy proposed to 
undermine the cause of  industrialisation and to increase the Reich’s self-su-
fficiency191. Hence claims could be furthered to territory along Germany’s 
eastern border that was ideal for agricultural cultivation and settlement192. 
According to Krüger, however, assisting Polish attempts at industrialisa-
tion would have provided the German minority with an incentive to actua-
lly remain in the newly created state of  Poland193. Germany’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis Poland would thus have increased. In this context, it is 
183 Ralph Schattkowsky, Deutschland und Polen, 69-80.
184 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 251.
185 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 251.
186 “ADAP”, Serie B, X, Anexo II, presumiblemente redactado por Stresemann a finales de diciembre de 1928, 613.
187 Albrecht Duwe, Damerau, 118.
188 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat?, 252.
189 Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 87-91.
190 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 306.
191 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 469.
192 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 469.
193 Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik, 306.
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interesting to note that the Auswärtiges Amt speculated that in April 1926 
a peaceful settlement regarding the frontier question could only be brou-
ght about in case Poland found herself  in severe economic and financial 
difficulties194.
ConClusion
When examining any aspect of  Weimar foreign policy, one is confronted 
with a set of  complex political issues arising from the horrendous events 
of  World War One and its direct aftermath. The German parliamentary 
democratic system was to suffer from numerous changes of  administra-
tion and a whole set of  other political, economic, social, and cultural issues 
had to be resolved. The revision of  parts of  the Paris Peace Conference 
agreements stipulating the loss of  territory, industrial capacity, and the 
payment of  reparations presented itself  as a key task for any Weimar go-
vernment. 
Germany’s relationship with her new eastern neighbour played a decisi-
ve role in foreign policy considerations, for the chances of  revision of  
the German-Polish frontier were seen by many in German society as an 
opportunity to regain a position of  strength. The practicality of  the peace 
settlement’s outcome regarding the former German territories that would 
become part of  the Polish State was called into question. The right to 
self-determination was in fact not granted to the German minority in Po-
land and both Germans and Poles attacked the minority protection system 
on numerous occasions. 
Gustav Stresemann’s tenure as Foreign Secretary gains special significance 
owing to the unusually long period of  time he served in various admi-
nistrations, as well as a set of  policies that remain highly contested until, 
this day. What were Stresemann’s actual goals and how did he set out to 
achieve them? Fischer clearly sees him as envisaging German expansio-
nist plans leading to the horrors of  the Third Reich. However, this paper 
194 “ADAP”, Serie B, II, i, no. 150, 19 de abril de 1926, 363.
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paints a far more complex picture. It is very difficult to establish the true 
nature of  Stresemann’s plans for Germany’s role in Eastern Europe, but 
they were surely more multifaceted than an outright revision of  the Ger-
man-Polish frontier for which the minority problem would simply provide 
an instrument. 
Doubtless, under Stresemann’s leadership Germany sought accommoda-
tion with Britain and France with the intention of  reaching a settlement 
over the Rhineland and the reparations question. Moreover, policy issues 
were deeply interconnected both in domestic and foreign politics. Stre-
semann had to rely on public approval, as well as the goodwill of  the 
western allies, and this might explain why he refused to push for a swift 
settlement of  the minority problem whilst showing increased interest at 
other times. As a matter of  fact, he led Germany into the League for he 
realised that the minority issue might be settled in international, rather 
than bilateral, negotiations.
There is evidence to suggest the existence of  the well-engineered network 
maintained by the Auswärtiges Amt to secretly channel subsidies to the Ger-
man minority. That could have been designed for two reasons: to weaken 
the Polish State from within so to extract concessions, or to mitigate the 
political influence of  anti-Weimar parties. This paper has presented seve-
ral sources for both assumptions. However, authorities under the Third 
Reich would potentially be able to abuse the secret apparatus.
The overall effectiveness of  the international minority protection system 
under the League of  Nations can be called into question, although the 
intention of  settling minority disputes through peaceful negotiation was 
laudable. Also, Germany was provided with a venue to express minority 
grievances, but Stresemann failed to dispel Polish fears of  German at-
tempts at frontier revision. However, the minority problem clearly shows 
that Germany had to confront a historical dilemma in that the agricultural 
East together with its socio-economic and political power structures in 
particular had to be accommodated to an emerging, modern, and increa-
singly industrialised society.
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